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PEOPLE v. KNOWLES .t a' 
Cr. 4992, 
Supreme Court of California, in Bank. 
April 21, 1950. 
Rehearing Denied May 18, 1950. 
David Knowles was convicted in Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County. Harold B. Land4 
reth, J.t of armed robbery and kidnappIng 
tor a purpose of robbery and he appealed 
from judgment of convictIon and from order 
had been forced into back room 25 feet 
away at point of gun and who struck victim 
over head, and threatened to strike another 
during time stealing of property occurred 
in store, was guilty of kidnapping. Pen. 
Code, § 209, 
4., CrIminal law e:;:,s 
Subject to the constitntional prohibi-
tion against cruel-and unusual punishment,-
the legislature may define and punish of-
fenses as it sees fi t. 
denying his motion for a new trial,' The 5. Criminal law ~5 , .- IL 
Supreme Conrt, Traynor, J., held that wbeth- The legislature ,could define kidnapping! 
er appellant was sufficiently identified as to include the detentIon of. a victim during 
guilty person was for trier of facts under evl. the commission of armed robbery and could 
dence, and that appellant oould not be oon- . prescribe discretionary death penalty _as 
victed ot both armed robbery and kidnapping. . h t f 'I t' n' f t tnt Pen 
PUUts men or VIO a 10 0 S a ~\,' ,. Order denying motion for new trial af- Code, § 209. 
firmed and judgments of conviction tor ,kid-
napping for purpose ot robbery affirm,ed, and 
judgments of conviction for armed' robbery 
reversed. 
Edmonds and Carter, JJ., and Gibson. 0. 
J., dissented. 
Prior oPinion" 204 P~2d 344. 
I. Kidnapping ¢=o6 
Robbery ~26 
In prosecution for armed robbery and 
kidnapping for purpose of robbery, whether 
defendant was sufficiently identified as 
gl-~ilty person was for trier of facts llnder 
tilC- ('vidence. Pen.Code, §§ 209, 211. 
2. Conatltutlonallaw 41=70(3) 
Courts cannot nullify a statnte merely 
because statnte may be unwise. 
3. Kidnapping 41=1 
Under statute penalizing one who 
seizes, confines, holds_ or detains another to 
commit extortion Or robbery, one who for 
15 or 20 minutes guarded witnesses who 
217 P.2d-l 
6. Statut •• 41=181(1) 
The will of the legislature must be de-
termined ,from .statutes and intentions at 
odds with intentions articulated .in statutes 
cannot be ascribed to legislature. 
~ . . , 
7. Statut •• 41=184, 214, 216; 217, ~2.5,_365 
. In determining the purpose .legislature ; 
sought to express by statute, the tourt first 
turns to the words themselves, and may 
also properly rely on extrinsic aids"history _ 
. of statute, legislative debates, committe.t 
reports, and statements to the voters on 
'initiative and referendum measures. 
8. Statut •• 41=190 
If statutory "words are clear, court 
should not add to or. alter them to ac~om" 
plish a purpose that does not appear on the 
face of the statute or from its legislative 
history, . 
9. Statut •• €=>190 
In interpreting a statute court can not 
'seek hidden meanings not suggested bi Stat.' 
-ute-or by available elCtrinskaids., .; 
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10. Criminal law €=>200(1) 
Where two offenses committed. by 
same act are such that commission of one 
is necessarily included in commission of the 
other, defendant can be punished only for. 
the commission of one. Pen.Code, § 654. 
II. Criminal law €=>200(1) 
Where course of criminal conduct 
causes commission of more than one of-
fense, each of which can be committed 
without committing any other, applicability 
of statute providing that act or omission 
which is made punishable in different ways 
by different provisions of Penal Code may 
be punished under either provision, but not 
under more than one, depends upon whether 
a separate or distinct act can be established 
as basis of each conviction, or whether 
single act has been so committed that mOTe 
than one statute has been violated. Pen. 
Code, § 654. 
12. Criminal law €=>200(1) 
A defendant who for 15 or 20 minutes 
guarded witnesses who had been forced into 
back room 25 feet away at point of gun, 
and who struck victim over the head, and 
threatened to strike another during time 
stealing of property from store occurred, 
could not be subj eeted to punishment for 
both kidnapping and robbery. Pen. Code §§ 
209,211, 654. 
13. Criminal law €=>1186(7) 
Where defendant was improperly con-
victed of both armed robbery and kid-
napping although defendant had committed 
only a single indivisible act, conviction for 
the more serious offense of kidnapping 
only would be affirmed and conviction for 
armed robbery would be reversed. Pen. 
Code, §§ 209, 211, 654. 
Rosalind G. Bates and Aileen M. Mac-
Lymont, Los Angeles, for" appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and 
Henry A. Dietz, Deputy Attorney General, 
for respondent. 
T~YNOR, Justice. 
Defendant and Caryl Chessman were 
Jointly charged by information with two 
counts of armed robbery, two counts of 
kidnapping for the purpose of ~obbery, and 
on.e count of grand theft. Defendant 
waived a jury and was tried separately. 
The trial court found him guilty on both 
counts of robbery and both counts of kid-
napping, but not guilty on the count of 
grand theft. It determined that one kid-
napping involved bodily harm to the victim 
and sentenced appellant to life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole. The 
sentences on the other offenses were to run 
concurrently. Defendant appeals from the 
judgment of conviction and the order deny-
ing his motion for a new trial, contending 
that the evidence is insufficient to establish 
his guilt and that armed robbery is not 
punishable as kidnapping under Penal Code 
section 209. 
On January 23, 1948, at about 6:30 p. m., 
defendant and Chessman entered a clothing 
store in Redondo Beach. There was no 
one in the store except the owner Melvin 
Waisler and Joe Lesher, a clerk. Defend-
ant asked to look at overcoats and Lesher 
showed him several while Chessman sat 
nearby and Waisler walked around the 
store. The accused stood in a well-lighted 
area, and Waisler and Lesher testified that 
they were able to get a good look at them. 
Shortly thereafter, defendant and Chess-
man displayed guns, saying "this is a stick-
up, put up your hands." They compelled 
Waisler and Lesher to enter a stockroom 
in the rear of the store and face the wall, 
and then took their wallets. Defendant 
held them at gunpoint in the stockroom 
while Chessman took -some clothes and at-
. tempted to open the cash register. He 
returned to the stockroom, forced Lesher to 
come back and open the register for him. 
and took money therefrom, after which he 
returned Lesher to the stockroom. Defend-
ant struck Waisler on the head with the" 
barrel of his gun, and then left with Chess-
. man. Waisler and Lesher ran to the front 
of the store in time to see defendant and 
Chessman escaping in a gray 1946 Ford 
coupe. They then notified the police. 
About an hour later, two police officers 
in a radio car observed the gray Ford 
proceeding in a northerly direction on Ver-
mont Avenue in Los Angeles, about half 
PEOPLE v. KNOWLJ.lS 
Cite as !!17 P.2d 1 
caL a 
a block south of Hollywood Boulevard. 
They pursued the Ford and saw Chessman, 
who was driving, turn into a service sta-
tion, circle it and drive out. The Ford 
proceeded south at high speed for about a 
mile, and when Chessman then attempted 
a U-turn the officers drove their car into 
the side of the Ford. Both men ran from 
the car but were quickly caught. The of-
ficers found the stolen clothing and a .45 
automatic in the rear of the Ford. Chess-
man had about $150 on his person and de-
fendant $8. 
To establish an alibi, defendant produced 
Miss Ann Stanfield who testified that he 
visited her at her residence in HoI1ywood 
at about 6:00 p. m. on the evening of the 
robbery and that he remained there for 
about -fifteen or twenty minutes. If her 
testimony were true, appetIant could not 
have been in Redondo Beach, 23 miles dis-
tant, at the time of the robbery. Defend-
ant testified that he met Chessman by ap-
pointment at the corner of Vermont Ave-
nue and Sunset Boulevard at about 7 :00 
p. m. on the evening of the robbery. He 
testified that there was a man in the car 
at the time introduced to him by Chess-
man as Joe, and that Joe rode with them 
when the police pursuit began, but got out 
of the car at the service station and ran 
into the rest room while Chessman and 
appel1ant drove off. Chessman corroborat-
ed defendant's story. 
The foregoing testimony was contradict-
ed in every material detail by witnesses 
for the prosecution. Waisler and Lesher 
positively identified defendant as a par-
ticipant in the robbery. The officers tes-
tified that they had the car in plain view 
at all times, that there were only two oc-
cupants, and that they saw none leave it 
at the station. The direct conflict in the 
evidence was resolved by the trial court 
in favor of the people. 
(1] Defendant contends that Waisler's 
and Lesher's identification of him does not 
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, because the identification was not by 
means of a standard potice line-up, and 
because they made the identification after 
being informed by the police that the roD-
bers had been canght and after they saw 
defendant's picture in the newspapers upon 
his arrest in company with Chessman, "a 
famous bandit." It is for the trier of 
facts to weigh the evidence relating to 
:identification and to resolve the conflicts 
therein. -~ His acceptance of an identifica-
tion not inherently improbable must be up-
held if there is substantial evidence to sup-
port it, even though the contradictory .evi-
dence, if believed, would have induced a 
contrary result. People v. Waller, 14 Cal. 
Zd 693, 700, 96 P.2d 344; People Y. 
Braun, 14 Cal.2d I, 5, 92 P.2d 402; Peo-
ple v. Farrington, 213 Cal. 459, 463, 2 P. 
2d 814; People v. Ash, 88 Cal.App.2d 819, 
825, 199 P.2d 711; People v. Alexander, 
78 Cal.App.2d 954, 957, 178 P.2d 813; Peo-
ple v. Tanner, 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 186, 175 
P.2d 26; People v. Deal, 42 CaI.App.2d 33, 
36, 108 P.2d 103. Substantial evidence of 
defendant's guilt leaves his first contention 
without merit. 
Defendant also contends -that the crime 
of which he was convicted is only armed 
robbery, and that Penal Code section 209 
cannot properly be construed as applicable 
to that crime. In his view the statute 
applies only to orthodox kidnapping for 
ransom or robbery not to the detention of 
the victim during the commission of armed 
robbery. This interpretation of section 209 
finds no support in its language or legisla-
tive history; it could not -be sanctioned 
without a pro tanto repeal by judicial fiat. 
[2J Defendant concedes that the lan-
guage of the statute does not in its or-
dinary, sense support his interpretation. 
Under that language one accused of armed 
robbery who has inflicted bodily harm on 
the victim can be charged with a capital 
offense. Reasonable men may regard the 
statute as unduly harsh and therefore un-
wise; if they do they should address their 
doubts to the Legislature. It is not for 
the courts to nullify a statute merely be .. 
cause it may be unwise. "We do not 
pause to consider whether a statute dif-
ferently conceived and framed wotdd yield 
results more consonant with fairness and 
reason. We take this statute as we find 
it." Cardozo J., in Anderson v. Wilson. 
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289 U.s. 20, 27, 53 S.Ct. 417, 420, 77 L 
Ed. 1004. 
Before its amendment in 1933, Penal 
Code section 209 provided that "Every per-
son who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudu-
lently takes or entices away any person 
with intent to restrain such person and 
thereby to commit extortion or robbery, 
or exact from the relatives or friends of 
such person any money or valuable thing" 
(Italics added) shall be punished byim-
prisonment for life or for a minimum of 
ten years. The 1933 amendment made the 
punishment, where the victim suffered bodi. 
ly harm, death or life imprisonment with-
out possibility of parole. At the same 
time, however, the Legislature redefined 
the offense to encompass "Every person 
who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, de-
toys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries 
away any individual by any means what-
soever with intent to hold or detain.~ or 
who holds or detains, such individual for 
ransom, reward or to commit extortion or 
robbery * * *." (Italics added.) The 
addition by amendment of the italicized 
words is a deliberate abandonment of the 
requirement of movement of the victim that 
characterized the offense of kidnapping 
proscribed bisection 209 before the amend-
ment. By that amendment the Legislature 
Uchanged the offense theretofore described 
in section 209 from one which required the 
asportation 0 f the victim to one in which 
the act of seizing for ransom, reward, or 
to commit extortion or robbery became a 
felony." People v. Raucho, 8 Cal.App.2d 
655, 663, 47 P.2d 1108, 1112. 
[3] The trial court found on substan-
tial evidence that defendant restrained 
Waisler and Lesher in the stockroom for 
about fifteen or twenty minutes and inflict-
ed bodily harm on Waisler during the de-
tention, while his confederate Chessman 
rifled the cash register. That conduct is 
clearly covered by the words of section 209 
given their plain meaning. Webster's New 
International Dictionary, Unabridged Edi-
tion (1943) defines useize" as "To take pos-
session of by force," and "confine" as UTa 
restrain within limits; to limit; • * * 
to shut up; imprison;" to put or keep iIi 
restraint * • • to keep from going 
out." Oearly a person is taken possession 
of by force when he is compelled to enter 
a r"oom at the point of a gun, as in this 
case. He is also testrained within limits, 
shut UP," and kept from" going out when 
he is forced to remain in that room for 
fifteen or twenty minutes. That he is held 
and detained thereby and that such deten-
tion was the purpose of the seizure and 
confinement is readily apparent. There can 
be no doubt therefore that defendant and 
Chessman seized and co,.fined the two 
victims with intent to hold and detain them 
or that they held and detained "such in-
dividual[s]" (the victims seized and con-
fined) to commit robbery. 
Defendant concedes that asportation of 
the victim is not an essential element of 
section 209, but he contends that the Leg-
islature intended that the statute apply only 
to acts of seizure and confinement incident 
to a "traditional act of kidnapping." The 
Legislature, however, has broadened the 
statutory prohibition to include not only 
the seizure and confinement of an individ-
ual ;n a traditional act of kidnapping (for 
ransom or reward), but also the seizure 
and confinement of an individual for the 
purpose of robbery, a purpose foreign to 
"traditional kidnapping" as defined by de-
fendant. It is therefore idle to suggest 
that conduct aptly described by the statute 
is not punishable thereunder. People v. 
Raucho, supra, 8 Ca1.App2d 655, 663, 47 
P2d 1108. 
[4-6] There is no question that the Leg-
islature has the power to define kidnapping 
broadly enough to include the offense here 
committed and to prescribe the punishment 
specified in section 209. Subject to the 
~onstitutional prohibition of cruel and un· 
usual punishment, the Legislature may de-
fine and punish offenses as it sees fit. 
People v. Lavine, 115 Ca1.App. 289, 297, 
1 P.Zd 496," appeal dismissed, Lavine v. 
People of State of California, 286 U.S. 
528, 52 S.Ct. 500, 76 L.Ed. 1270. It may 
define and punish as kidnapping an offense 
that other states regard only as armed rol>-
bery. Section 209 establishes that defini-
tion as the law of Californ;a. People v. 
PEOPLE v. KNOWLES Cal. 5 
Cite .. 11:1 P.lid I 
Tanner, 3 Ca1.Zd 279, 296, 44 P.2d 324. to the words themselves· for the answer. 
The statutory definition of 'the proscribed It may also proPerly rely on extrinsic aids, 
offenses is not rendered uncertain or am~ the history of the statute, the legislative 
biguous because some of the prohibited acts debates, committee reports, statements to 
are not ordinarily regarded as kidnapping. the voters on initiative and refere'ndwn 
'When the Legislature has made such acts measures. Primarily, however, the words, 
punishable as kidnapping, this court should. in arrangement that superimposes the pur-
not impute to the 5t~tute a meaning not pose of the Legislature upon their diction-
rationally supported by its wording. "The - ary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, 
judgment of the court H I interpret the reminders that whether their arrangement 
reasoning aright does not rest upon a rul· was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly un-
ing that Congress would have gone be-· dertaken and not to be disregarded. 
yond its power if the purpose that it pro- [8~ 9] "While courts are no longer con-
fessed was the purpose truly cherished. fined to the language [of the statute], they 
The judgment of the court rests upon the are still confined by it. Violence must not 
ruling that another purpose not professed, be done to the word. chosen by the legis-
may be read beneath the surface, and by lature," Frankfurter, Some Reflections on 
the purpose so imputed the statute is de- the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia Law 
stroyed. Thus the process of psychoanaly- Rev. 527, 543. A standard of conduct 
sis has spread to unaccustomed fields. prescribed by a statute would hardly com-
There is a wise and ancient doctrine that 
mand acceptance jf the statute were given 
a court wiIl not inquire into the motives an interpretation contrary _ to the interpre-
of a legislative body." Cardozo, J., dis- tation ordinary men subject to the statute 
senting in United States v.· Constantine, would give it. "After all, legislation when 
296 U.S. 287, 298-299, 56 S.C!. 223, 228, not expressed in technical terms is ad-
80 L.Ed. 233; Smith v. Union· Oil Co. of dressed to the common run of men and is 
California, 166 Cal. 217" 224, 135 P. 966; therefore to be understood according to the 
City of Eureka v. Diaz, 89 Cal. 467, 469. sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has 
470, 26 P. 961; Callahan v. City and County a right to rely on o·rdinary words ad-
of San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.2d 286, 290, dressed to him." Addison v. Holly Hill 
156 P.2d 479. The will of the Legislature Fruit Products Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618, 64 
must be determined from the statutes; in. 22 L S.C!. 1.215, I I, 88 .Ed. 1488, 153 A.L.R. 
tentions cannot be ascribed to it at odds 1007; see also McBoyle v. United States, 
with the intentions articulated in the stat- 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.C!. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816. 
utes. Section 209 c1eat'ly prohibits and If the words of the statute are clear, the 
punishes the offense committed -by defend- coun shOUld 'not add to or alter them to ac • 
. ,ant; ,there is no basis : for supposing that the 'complish a purpose that does not _app~a'i- on 
Legislature did not mean what it,said. 'the face of the statute or from its legis!a-
[7] . An, insi~tet1ce . upon . judicial re- tive history: Matson Nav, .Co. v. United· 
gard for lheWard' of a statute does not .States, 284 U.S. 352, 356, 52 S:Ct. 162, 76 , 
imply that they are '.Iike Words in' a '.die- . 'LEd. 336'; State.Board of Equalization.of 
tionary, to be read with no ·ranging of the Californiav. Ye>ung's Market Co., 299 U:S. 
mind. They are no longer a! rest in their "59,62'64, 57 S.Ct. 7'1,81 L.Ed. 38; Unite~ 
alphabetic,lI hi",.: Released,conibin:e~l .in States v. Johnson,22!U.S .. 488, 496, 31 S. 
phrasd tha~ imperfectly communicate the Ct. 627, 55 L.Ed. 823; • In r~ Miller, 31 
thoughts· of 'one man to anOther, they chal- Cal.2d 191, 198-199, 187 P.2d 722; Caminetti 
·lenge men to giv'e',then"l" more '(han 'passive v." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 
reading, io consider wen thdr cOllt""t, to 22 Cal.2d 344, 353-354, 139 P.2d 908; Sea-
ponder what may be their consequences. board Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, ·214 Cal. 
SpeCUlation cuts brush with the pertinent 361, 369, 5 P.2d 882; People ·v. Stanley, 
question: what purpose did the Legisla- 193 Cal. 428, 431, 225 P. 1; Mulville v. 
tUre .eek te> express as it strung those City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734;'739, 192 
words into a statute? The court turns first P. 702; Gordon v. City of Los Angeles, 63 
... 
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Ca1.App.2d 812, 816, 147 P.2d 961; People 
v. One 1941 Buick 8, 63 Cal.App.2d 661, 
667, 147 P.Zd 401; People v. Pacific Guano 
Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848-849, 132 P.Zd 
254; see also De Sloovere, The Equity and 
Reason of a Statute, 2I Cornell Law Quar. 
591, 605, Contextual Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 5 Fordham Law Rev. 219, 221, 230; 
Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 88 Univ. of Penn. Law Rev. 527, 531, 
538; Cox, Learned Hand and the Inter-
pretation of Statutes, 60 Ha'rv. Law Rev. 
370, 374-375; Jones, Statutory Doubts and 
Legislative Intention, 40 Columbia Law 
Rev. 957, 964, 974, and Extrinsic Aids in the 
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 
Wash. U.L.Q. 2, 8, 9. Certainly the court 
is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings 
not suggested by the statute or by the avail-
able extrinsic aids. In re Miller, 31 Ca1.2d 
191, 198-199, 187 P.2d 722, and cases cited 
therein. 
Defendant's interpretation of the statute 
rests entirely upon speculation. It finds 
no support in the statutory language or its 
contextual implications or in the legislative 
history of the statute. He relies upon the 
wave of public indignation at the wide-
spread kidnapping for ransom during the 
early nineteen-thirties as a motivation for 
the statute. He takes no account of the 
equally rampant and terrorizing a'rmed rob-
bery that compelled the attention of state 
legislatures at the same time. There is no 
reason to suppose that the latter evil was 
not in the minds of the authors of the stat-
ute, particularly in view of the retention 
of the lito commit * * * robbery" pro-
vision. The contention that only orthodox 
kidnapping for ransom was contemplated 
by the statute is hardly tenable in view of 
the broad scope of the federal Lindbergh 
Law that served as a model for the re-
vision of section 209. The federal statute 
<lid not limit its prohibition to kidnapping 
for the purpose of ransom or reward. It, 
Act of May 18, 1934, c. 301, 48 Stat. 781, 
18 U.S.C. § 408a [1948 Revised Criminal 
Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201], provides a dis-
cretionary death penalty fO'r the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of a person 
"held for ransom or reward or otherz.uise." 
(Italics added.) The holding of an officer 
to prevent the arrest of his captor, although 
admittedly not within the concept of 
orthodox kidnapping for ransom or pe-
cuniary benefit, was held punishable under 
the statute. Gooch v. United States, 297 
U.S. 124, 126, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522. 
Since 1901, the Legislature has included 
robbery as one of the purposes of kid-
napping prohibited under section 209. 
There is no indication that in making the 
penalty therefor more severe and the con~ 
cept of the crime so broad that movement 
of the victim was no longer required, the 
Legislature intended to apply these pro-
visions only to kidnapping for ransom or 
reward. "Familiar legal expressions in 
their familiar legal sense", Henry v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 393, 395, 40 S.Ct. 185, 
186, 64 L.E<l. 322, used by the Legislature 
indicates the contrary, that the broad COV~ 
erage was intended. 
Given the unequivocal language of the 
statute, there is no merit to defendant's 
contention that the Legislature did not in-
tend to change the substantive nature of the 
existing crime. Certainly that contention 
finds no support in any of the cases decided 
under the statute. In People v. Tanner, 3 
Ca1.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324, the defendants 
forced the victim to ~ from his driveway 
to his house at gun point and there question-
ed him about the location of money that 
they had heard was on the premises. On 
appeal from their conviction under section 
209, they contended that their offense was 
only armed robbery and that the Legislature 
did not intend 00 punish it under a kidnap-
ping statute. The court affirmed the con~ 
viction, holding that the Legislature is em· 
powered to define criminal offenses as it 
sees fit and that the statute clearly indicates 
an intention to punish standstill kidnapping 
under its provisions. It is suggested that 
under the statute there must be movement 
of the victim, under a preconceived plan for 
protracted detenti'on to obtain property that 
would not be available in the course of ordi-
nary armed robbery. Defendant seeks to 
read into 'Ute statute a condition that the 
victim be moved a substantial distance. The 
statute itself is a refutation of that con ten· 
tion. Movement of the victim is only one 
of several methods by which the statutory 
. PEOPLE v.kN01vLES Cal 7 
Cite .. :817 P." 1 
offense may be committed. The statute pre>- failed to show that the girl was held against 
vides that "Every person -who seizes, con- her will as required by the Act. ."But the 
fines * * * or who holds or detains [any] broadness of the statutory langoage does 
individual * • • to commit extortion or not permit us to tear the words Qut of their 
robbery * • • is guilty of a felony." It is context, using the magic of lexigraphy to 
contended that the statute cannot properly apply them to unattractive or immoral situa-
be read with the omissions indicated, for all tions -lacking the involuntariness of seizure 
that is then left is "cautious legal verbiage" and detention which is the very essence of 
of no significance. :rhe statute, however, the crime of kidnap-ping, Thus~ if this es-
sets forth the conditions as alternative ones, sentwl element is missing, the act of "ar-
and only one need be present. Thus, under ticipating in illicit f"elations or contributing 
a statute providing that the victim be seized to the delinquency of a mifl,or or enter-
or abducted, a defendant who has seized ing into a celestial marriage, foUowed by 
a victim cannot claim exemption from the interstate transportation, does. not consti-
statute because he has n~t also abducted tute a crime under the Federal Kidnapping 
him. .Act." Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 
There is no condition in the statute that 
kidnapping be premeditated as part of a 
robbery or that robbery be premeditated as 
part of a kidnapping. In People v. Brown, 
29 Cal.2d 555, 558-559, 176 P.2d 929, this 
court rejected an attempt to read into the 
statute a condition that the robbery be 
premeditated, where the defendant ab-
ducted a woman to commit rape. After 
raping her he took her wrist watch. A find-
ing that the victim suffered bodily harm was 
supported both by the forcible rape and by 
the fact that the defendant subsequently 
struck her. The judgment imposing the 
death penalty was affirmed on the ground 
that the taking of the wrist watch made 
the abduction kidnapping to commit rob~ 
hery, even if the original objective were 
~ape and the intent to rob was only an after-
thought. See also People v. Kristy, 4 
Cal.2d 504,'50 P.2d 798; People v. Holt, 
93 A.C.A. 603,606, 209 P.2d 94; People 
v. Melendrez, 25 Cal.App.2d 490, 77 P.2d 
870; People v. Johnston, 140 Cal.App. 
729, 35. P.2d 1074. 
Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 
66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198, affords no sup-
port' for appellant's contention. In that 
case, a conviction under the Federal Kid-
napping Act of a member of a plural mar-
riage sect for the interstate transportation 
of his lS-year old "celestial spouse" was 
reversed on the ground that the record 
• Penal Code section 211: ·'Robbery is the 
feloniOUS taking of personal property 
in the possession of another, from his 
455, 464, 66 S.Ct. 233, 237, 90 L.Ed. 198. 
Italics added. There is no intimation that 
had the restraint been forcible, the trans-
portation would not have been within the 
broad meaning of the fror otherwise" clause 
of the federal act. Similarly, in a case 
like the present one, where the seizure 
and restraint are clearly forcible and the 
purpose of the seizure is robbery, the of-
fense is kidnapping within the meaning of 
section 209. 
[10] Defendant's convictions for violaw 
tion of Penal Code section 209 (kidnapping) 
and Penal Code section 211 (robbery) both 
rest upon the commission of a single act: 
the taking of personal property- in the pos-
session of Waisler and Lesher from their 
persons and in their immediate possession 
by force and fear*, namely, by seizing and 
confining them under force of arms. The 
seizure and confinement were an insepara-
ble part of the robbery. Penal Code section 
654 provides: "An act or omission which is 
made punishable in different ways by differ-
ent provisions of this code may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no 
case can it be punished under more than 
one; an acquittal or conviction and ·sen-
tence under either one bars a prosecution 
for the same act or omission under any 
other." If the two offenses committed by 
the same act are such that the commission 
of one is necessarily included in the corn-
person or immediate presence, and 
against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear." 
-----------------------------------------
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mission of the other, the defendant can be' 
punished only for the commission of one, 
People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 596, 184 
P.2d 512, 516: "Where an offense cannot 
be committed without necessarily commit-
ting another offense, the latter is a neces-
sarily included offense." The use of a 
minor to transport narcotics, Health and 
Safety Code, § 11714, necessarily con-
tributes to the delinquency of that minor, 
Welfare & Institutions Code, § 702. Sec-
tion 654 requires that the defendant be 
punished only for one of those offenses. 
People v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598, 
149 P.2d 416. Similarly the commission of 
statutory rape necessarily contributes to 
the delinquency of the 1n1nOr victim and a 
defendant cannot be punished for violation 
of both statutes on the -basis of the one 
act. People v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 596, 
184 P.2d 512. 
[11] But, the applicabilityof section 654 
15 not limited to- necessarily included of-
fenses. If a course of criminal conduct 
c.auscs the commission of more than one 
offense, each of which can be committed 
without committing any other, the applic. 
ability of section 654 wilJ depend upon 
whether a separate and -distinct act can be 
established as the basis of each convictiori, 
or whether a single act has been so commit-
ted that more than one statute has been 
violated. If only a single act is charged as 
the basis of the multiple convictions, only 
one conviction can be -affirmed, notwith-
standing that the offenses are not necessar-
ily induded offenses. It is the singleness of 
the act and not of the offense that is deter-
minative. A statute providing for the pun-
ishment of any person operating a "still" or 
having a "still" in his possessi'on, Stats. 
1927, c. 277, p. 497, states two distinct of-
fenses: operation and possession. If, how-
ever, the only act of possession is that 
necessarily incident to the operation, only 
one conviction can be affirmed. People v. 
Clemett, 208 Cal. 142, 146, 280 P. 681. An 
unsuccessful attempt at murder by use of 
a bomb may form the basis ,for convictions 
of 'attempted murder, assault with intent to. 
kill, or malicious use of explosives. In-
sofar as only a single act is charged as the 
basis of the convictions, however, the de-
fendant can be punished only once. People 
v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 762, 104 P.2d 
794. The possession of narcotics. is an of-
fense distinct from the transportation there-
of, but there Can be only one conviction 
when a single act of transportation is 
proved and the only act of possession is 
that incident to the transportation. Schroe~ 
der v. United States, 2 Cir., 7 F.2d 60, 65. 
In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 600, 184 
P.2d 512, the defendant was charged with 
the violation of Penal Code section 261(1) 
and Penal Code section 288. Both charges 
were based upon a single act of sexual 
intercourse with a girl under 14. It is 
possible to violate either statute without 
violating the other, and this court there 
stated that if the commission of separable 
and distinct acts were charged, although 
they might have been committed at rela-
tively the same time, the convictions of 
both offenses would be upheld. If, as in 
that case, however, the violation of both 
statutes is predicated on the commission 
of a single act of sexual intercourse, Penal 
Code section 654 requires that the defend-
ant be punished under only one statute. 
The distinction recognized in People v. 
Greer, supra, has permitted the affirmance 
of multiple convictions in cases in which 
separate and divisible acts have been 
proved as the basis of each conviction, even 
though those acts were closely connected 
in time and were part of the same 'Criminal 
venture. In People v. Slobodian, 31 Cal.2d 
555, 561-563, 191 P.2d I, this court sus-
tained ,convictions under Penal Code sec-
tions 288 and 288a based upon a course of 
conduct with a young girl where the com-
mission of a separate act as the basis of 
each offense was proved. See also, People 
v. Pickens, 61 Ca1.App. 405, 407, 214 P. 
1027; People v. Ciulla, 44 Cal.App. 725, 187 
P. 49. In People v. Ciulla, supra, the court 
sustained convictions for kidnapping under 
Penal Code section 207 and forcible rape, 
both offenses having been committed upon 
the same girl, for the reason that the acts 
charged were separate and divisible and 
were. connected only by the fact that they 
were part of a single criminal venture. 
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[12] Since defendant's, convictions were successful attempt to secure information _as 
predicated upon the commission of a single' to the location of other property. 
act, he cannot be subjected to pun~shment 
for both offenses under the rule of People 
v. Greer, supra. Defendant committed no 
act of seizure or confinement other than 
that necessarily incident to the commission 
of robbery. Waisler and Lesher were re~ 
strained only while the actual taking of 
personal property was being accomplished. 
No separate act not essential to the com· 
mission of the :robbery was charged or 
proved. For that reason, there is no in-
consistency between this case and those in 
which this court has affirmed multiple con· 
victions of kidnapping and robbery. In 
each of those cases, the' acts that formed 
the basis of the kidnapping conviction were 
separate from those that involved the actual 
taking of property. In People v. Brown, 29 
Cal.2d 555, 176 P.2d 929, the defendant" 
for-ced his victim to drive ,a considerable 
distan"ce to the outskirts of the city whe,re 
they stopped and he raped her. While she 
was dressing, he took her wristwatch. The 
abduction or carrying away upon which the 
kidnapping .conviction was based was 
separable from the robbery and not essen· 
tiat to its commission. In People v. Dor· 
man, 28 Cal.2d 846, 172 P.2d. 686, the de-
fendants drove their victim about for 
several hours without attempting robbery, 
then murdered him and only thereafter took 
his money. Again, the act of kidnapping 
was separable from the commission o£ rob-
bery, See also, People v. Pickens. 61 Cat. 
App. 405, 407, 214 P. 1027. In People v. 
Kristy, 4 Ca1.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798, the de-
fendants robbed their vi'Ctims and then kid-
napped them to accomplish their escape 
from prison. In People v. Pearson, 41 Cal. 
App.2d 614, 107 P.2d 463, habeas corpus 
denied In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 186 P. 
2d 401, the defendant robbed X and there-
after forced Y and Z to drive him away 
in an attempt to escape. He was convicted 
of the robbery of X and the kidnapping of 
Y and Z. In People v. Tanner, 3 Ca1.2d 
279, 44 P.2d 324, the defendants first took 
the valuables that formed the basis of the 
robbery conviction and thereafter confined 
their vi-ctims and tortured them in an un-
111 P.ld--l \6 
1:13] Unlike the defendants in the fore-
going cases, Knowles committed no act of 
kidnapping that was not coincident with 
the taking of personal property. There was 
no seizure or confinement that could be 
separated from the actual robbery as a 
separate and distinct act. Since be com-
mitted only a single, indivisible act, Penal 
Code section 654 requires that he be pun-
ished only once therefor. In view of the 
fact that the Legislature prescribed greater 
punishment for the violation of section 209 
it must be deemed to have considered that 
the more serious offense. and the convic-
tions thereunder must he the ones affinned. 
People v. Kehoe, 33 Ca1.2d 711, 716, 204 P. 
2d 321; People v. Chapman, 81 Ca1.App.2d 
857, 866, 185 P.2d 424; People v. Degnen, 
70 Ca1.App. 567, 578, 234 P. 129; Durrett 
v. United States, 5 Cir., 107 F.2d 438, 439; 
Hewitt v. United States, 8 Cir., 110 F.2d I, 
10-11; People v. Goggin and Murphy, 281 
N.Y. 611, 22 N.E.2d 174, affirming 256 
App.Div.995, 10 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587; People 
v. Heacox, 231 App.Div. 617, 247 N.Y.S. 
464,466. 
The order denying the motion for..a new 
trial is affirmed. The judgments of convic-
tion of kidnapping for the purpose of rob-
bery are affirmed, and the judgments of 
conviction of armed robbery are reversed. 
SHENK, SCHAUER, and SPENCE, 
]]., conCUT. 
EDMONDS, Justice (dissenting). 
By the present decision, "the detention of 
a victim during the commission of armed 
robbery" constitutes kidnaping, and al-
though "[d]efendant committed no act of 
seizure or confinement other than that 
necessarily incident. to the commission of 
robbery", he may be prosecuted either for 
robbery or for kidnaping at the election of 
the district attorney. As I read section 
209 of the Penal Code, it neither compels 
nor warrants this construction, and it is a 
startling innovation in erimiDallaw that. an 
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act which constitutes robbery is also kid-
naping. 
Under the law now stated, the crime of 
kidnaping may merge into the crime of 
robbery. In its practical operation, where 
one is 'Convicted of robbery only he may be 
imprisoned for a period of from five years 
to life. If he is convicted only of kidnap-
ing, under certain circumstances he may be 
confined for life, with the possibility of be-
ing released upon parole. But if he is 
guilty not only of kidnaping but also of 
robbery, since under section 654 of the 
Penal Code he cannot be punished for both 
crimes, his term of imprisonment may be 
only for the period prescribed for one of 
them. 
Thus one who also robs will receive no 
greater punishment than the criminal who 
does nothing more than kidnap a person. 
This is a clear invitation to the kidnaper. 
He has nothing to lose if he also takes 
-property from his victim's person or 00· 
mediate presence by means of force or fear 
(Penal Code, sec. 211). Under the present 
"decision, if prosecuted for both kidnaping 
and robbery, punishment can be imposed 
only for kidnaping. Otherwise stated, in· 
stead of being subject to imprisonment upon 
two se'ntences, each of which may be for 
life with the possibility of parole and, in 
practical effect terms of confinement for 
years, he can only be given one such sen-
tence, with consequent reduction in the 
time to be served in prison. The fad that 
Knowles will be subject to imprisonment 
for life without the possibility of parole 
under one of the sentences for kidnaping 
does not warrant a construction of the ap-
plicable statutes to allow a substantial de-
crease in the amount of punishment in those 
cases where the victim was kidnaped and 
robbed but suffered no physical harm. 
Under the rule now stated, section 209 
of the Penal Code may be applied in con-
nection with section 1159. By the latter 
statutes, ('The jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense, the commission of 
which is necessarily included in that with 
whkh he is charged * * *." As an act 
of robbery now will also constitute a kid-
napiIlg, the jury may find one charged with 
robbery guilty of kidnaping. As a result, 
one who ordinarily would be subjected to a 
sentence for a minimum term of one yeaT 
may be executed. From now on, many 
charges of attempted robbery, and every 
one of robbery, inevitably will be prosecu-
tions for a crime which may be punishable 
by death. 
Unquestionably, the Legislature has the 
power to make either attempted robbery or 
robbery a capital offense. But in my opin-
ion, considering both the language and his-
torical background of section 209, it has 
not done so. A cardinal rule of statutory 
interpretation is that where "* * * a 
statute is fairly susceptible of two construc-
tions, one leading inevitably to mischief or 
absurdity and the other consisting of sound 
sense and wise policy, the former should be 
rejected and the latter adopted." People v. 
Ventura Refining Co., 204 Cal. 286, 292, 
268 P. 347, 350, 283 P. 60; San Joaquin & 
Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. 
Stevinson, 164 Cal. 221, 128 P.924. 
As amended in 1933, section 209 pro-
vides: "Every person who seizes, confines, 
inveigles, entices, -decoys, abducts, conceals, 
kidnaps or carries away any individual by 
any means whatsoever 'U.Jith intcn·t to hold 
or deta.in, or who holds or detains~ such 
individual for ransom, reward or to commit 
extortion or robbery -* * *" is punish-
able for kidnaping. [Italics added.] The 
proper construction of the statute largely 
turns upon the meaning of the italicized 
words. The prevailing opinion also stresses 
the words "seizes" and "confines", although 
each of them is consistent with the tradi-
tional concept of kid-naping, and unlike 
those italicized does not pertain to conduct 
invariably present in robbery. 
As defined in Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary, Unabridged Edition 
(1943), the word "seize" means: "Transi-
tive. * * * 2. b To take possession of 
by force; • • • 4. To lay hold of sud-
denly or forcibly; * * * 5. To take 
prisoner; * * * Intransitive. * * * 
3. To make a snatch or clutch." Syno-
nyms for "seize" are listed as "Catch, grip; 
apprehend, arrest, take, capture." The 
same authority defines the word "confine" 
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as ". • • transitive. * • • 2. To dividual for ransom, reWard or to commit 
restrain within limits; to limit; • • • extortion or robbery * • • " [Italics 
to shut up; imprison; to put or keep in re- added] is also guilty of kidnaping. The 
straint * * *." Synonyms listed are phrase IJ. * • who holds or detains" is 
"Restrain, immure, circumscribe, compass; qualified by the words ". • • such in-
incarcerate, cage." dividual." The words "such individual" 
The definitions and synonyms demon-
strate that the words "seizes" and "con-
fines" are consistent with conduct which, 
until the present decision, has been under-
stood to amount to kidnaping. Although 
proof of asportation is not necessary to 
sustain a conviction, nevertheless much 
more is required than the mere Udetention" 
almost invariably present in attempted rob-
bery or robbery. Words like "take prison-
er," "arrest," "imprison," and "incareerate" 
suggest the more !purposeful aspect of the 
control exercised by the wrongdoer over 
the victim's person which is present in kid-
naping. 
As to the controversial words of section 
209 designated by italics, the first clause of 
the statute defines the specific intent neceS-
sary to establish the crime of kidnaping. 
Rather than the requirement prior to 1933 
that the acts be done "maliciously, f~rcibly, 
or fraudulently," the amended statute de-
clares that the acts need only be done 
'I. • • with intent to hold or detain." 
None of the acts listed in the first clause is 
that of holding or detaining. The eonduct 
described as constituting kidnaping is the 
act of seizing, confining, inveigling, en-
ticing, decoying, abducting, concealing, kid-
naping or carrying away any individual 
with ,,,tent '0 /wId or detoMl 'him. [Italics 
added.] Had the Legislature intended the 
detention of the victim, in and-of itself, to 
constitute kidnaping, that conduct would 
have been stated as the criminal act de-
nounced, rather than being used to describe 
the ~ecessary intent. 
The- first clause, therefore, defines as a 
crime any bue of a series of specified acts 
done to u. . • any individual • * ." 
with the specific intent to hold or detain 
him. Following this clause is the disjunc-
tive 'Word, "or." This word introduces an 
:.tlternative definition of kidnaping. One It. -* • who holds or detains, such in-
must refer to the antecedent noun, "in-
dividual." in the preceding clause. And 
t,he word "individual" in the first clause is 
qualified as one whom a person II. · · 
seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, 
abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away 
.... " 
Applying these plain grammatical prin-
ciples, it follows that the only type of hold-
ing or detaining which may constitute kid-
naping under section 209 is the holding or 
detaining of an individual who has previ-
ously been kidnaped in the well understood 
sense. It is clear that the words "holding" 
and "detaining" are used in the code section 
to extend the definition of kidnaping to one 
who acts as the guard or keeper of the kid-
naped victim. The inclusion of the words ff. * • who aids or abets • • ." re-
flects a superabundance of caution on the 
part of the Legislature, and also demon-
strates an intent to m-ake even one who 
aids the keeper guilty of kidnaping. 
For these reasons, the language used by 
the Legislature makes it clear that mere 
detention is not sufficient to constitute kid-
naping, excepting where the detention fol-
lows a traditional act of kidnaping. Gram-
matically, the construction which the court 
has placed upon the statute is not supported 
by its language. And even if there were 
sound grammatical authority for the con-
clusion reached, the individual words of a 
statute should not be subjected to semantic 
dissection; the severed members are cold 
and lifeless without the spirit of the law. 
The historical background and develop-
ment of section 209 also lead to_ the conclu-
sion that simple detention during an act 
of robbery does not constitute kidnaping. 
In analyzing the evolution of the legisla-
tion, it is essential to distinguish between 
the two statutory crimes of. kidnaping 
which exist in California and in most 
modern jurisdictions. The first, and more 
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historica\1y orthodox form of the offense, 
is defined in section 207 of the Penal Code. 
It is, with -certain modifications which 
harmonize its terms with modern political 
development, the continuation of the crime 
of kidnaping as it has existed since before 
the Christian era. See Lardone, Kidnaping 
in Roman Law, 1 U.Det.L.J. 163-171. At 
common law, as under the earlier Jewish 
law, kidnaping was "the forcible abduction 
or stealing away of a man, woman or chilld 
from * * * [his] own country, and 
sending * * * [him] into another." 4 
BI.Comm. [Christian Ed.] 221. This is sub-
stantially the crime defined by section 207 
as it was enacted in 1872 and has since re-
mained without material change. Amended 
Stats.190S, p. 653, to add "carries him into 
another * * * county, ()'Y into a·nother 
part of the same county." 
The second crime of kidnaping is of com-
paratively recent origin. Perhaps no mod~ 
em crime is as deeply and inescapably 
attached to its historical basis as is kidnap~ 
ing for pecuniary purposes, and any ade~ 
quate analysis of the offense necessarily 
must be based upon thorough understanding 
and appreciation of that background. 
Apparently kidnaping for ransom was 
unknown at common law. One of the first 
reported' instances of the crime in this 
country occurred. in 1874. Ross, The Kid~ 
napped Child [1876], cited and discussed in 
12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 646, 649-50. The next 
kidnaping for the purpose of ransom which 
attracted great attention was in 1900 when 
Edward Cudahy was abducted and $25,000 
demanded for. his release. Spreading Evil 
-The Autobiography of Pat Crowe [1927], 
cited and discussed in 12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 
646, 650-51. In the following year, One of 
the first of the kidnaping for ransom stat~ 
utes to be enacted in the United States was 
adopted in Illinois, which from the outset, 
made kidnaping "for the purpose of extort~ 
ing ransom" a capital offense. Stats.111. 
1901, p. 145, sec. 1. Other jurisdictions en-
acted similar statutes, but the penalty pre~ 
scribed was generally no more than life 
imprisonment, although uniformly wen in 
excess of the penalty under the pre~exist~ 
ing crime of fCcommon~law'J kidnaping, such 
as that defined in section 207 of the Penal 
Code. 
In 1901 the California Legislature enact-
ed section 209 of the Penal Code, which 
read: "Every person who maliciously, 
forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices 
away any ,person with intent to restrain 
such person and thereby to commit extor-
tion or robbery, or exact from the relatives 
or friends of such person any money or 
valuable thing, is guilty of a felony, and 
shall be punished therefor by imprisonment 
in the state's prison for life, or any number 
of years not less than ten." 5tats.1901, ch. 
83, p. 98. This section differed from the 
majority of kidnaping for ransom or extor-
tion statutes by enumerating robbery as an 
additional purpose of the unlawful act. In-
asmuch as extortion, as then defined, was 
,"the obtaining of property from another, 
·with his consent" Pen.Code § 518, enacted 
1872, quite evidently the Legislature deter-
mined that robbery should be specified as 
a purpose in order to inclUde the taking of 
a thing of value from the person of the vic-
tim, against his will. People v. Fisher, 30 
CatApp. 135, 157 P. 7 (promissory note and 
deeds to property); People v. Salter, S9 
Cal.App.2d 59, 137 P.2d 840 (combination 
to office sa fe). 
Although in the years after the first 
World War a number of isolated kidnap· 
ings for ransom occurred, "it was not until 
the latter part of 1931 that the public began 
to be aware of the fact that kidnapings 
were becoming more numerous, and that the 
hit~or-miss methods of the lone criminal 
had given away to the carefuUy planned 
activity of the professional." Fisher & Mc-
Guire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lind-
berg Law, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 646, 652 
(citing Sullivan, The Snatch Racket, 1931). 
"Kidnaping appeared to have acquired some 
of the characteristics of a profitable and 
skilled profession." Finley, The Lindberg 
Law, 28 Georgetown L.R. 908, 909. The 
Lindberg kidnaping awakened the Ameri-
can people to the fact that a revolting 
crime was being generally committed and 
unless the menace was met fearlessly Mid 
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with determination, "the very sanction of particularly by the Federal government, is. 
th~ criminal law was threatened." 'Fisher clearly demonstrated by the statistics which 
& McGuire, Kidnapping, supra. show a decrease' in kidnaping -and a larger 
The Federal Kidnaping Act, the so-called percentage of convictions for the commis-
Lindberg Law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201, June 22, sion of this crime. See Bomar, The Lind-
1932, ch. 271, § 1, 47 Stat. 326, was "drawn berg Law, 1 Law & Contemp.Prob. 435;' 
in 1932 against a background of organized Fisher & 'McGuire, Kidnapping, supra. 
violence. 75 Cong.Re<:. 13282-13304. Kid- California is almost unique in its specifi-
naping by that time had become an cation of robbery as one of the purposes 
epidemic in the United States. Ruthless for kidnaping. Other than Nevada and 
criminal bands utilized every known legal Arizona, where the statute is modeled upon 
and scientific means to achieve their aims the California code section, Nev.Comp. 
and to protect themselves. Victims were Laws 1931-41, Supp. vol. 2, § 10612.01; 
selected from among the wealthy with great Ariz.Code Anno. [1939] vol. 3, § 43-3202, 
care and study. Details of the seizures only two states in the United States speeify 
and detentions were fully and meticulously robbery as a purpose for kidnaping. Ark. 
worked out in advance. Ransom was the Stats.1947 Anno. vol. 4, § 41-2302; Wyf'. 
usual motive." Chatwin v. United States, Comp.Stats.1945 Ann. vol. I, § 9-214. The 
1946, 326 U.S. 455, 462-463, 66 S.Ct. 233, vast majority of American jurisdictions list 
236, 90 L.Ed. 198. ·~ransom" or "extortion" as the dominant 
It was in this nation-wide atmosphere of purpose.1 Five states, however, ,follow 
public alarm that, in 1933, the California the New York pattern of having a single 
Legislature amended section 209 of the crime of kidnaping, the only purpose, speci, ... 
Penal Code to make kidnaping for ransom, fled bei~g to hold or detain,! although in 
reward, . extortion or robbery a capital New York, Delaware and Maryland; the 
crime. During the years 1933 to 1935, offense, thus broadly defined, may' carry a 
similar statutes were enacted in almost all death penalty • 
of the other states, or the punishment speci...' 
lied by existing statutes defining kidnaping 
was increased. The effectiveness of this 
uniform action by the various states, and 
I. 18 U.S.O.A.' 1201: Oolo.Stats.Ann. 
[1935] ch. 48. § 77(4); Gen.Stats.Conn. 
, [1949 Rev.] vol. 3, § 8372; Dist.CoL 
Oode [1940], § 22-2101: Fl •. Stat,.Ann. 
vol. 22, § 805.02: Georgia Code [1933], 
§ 26-1603; Smith-Hurd II1.Ann.Ststs., 
ch. 38, I 386; Gen.Stats.Ksn.Ann. 
[1935]. eh. 21, Art. 4, § 449: !{y.Rev. 
Stats.1948, I 435.140; Annotated Laws 
of Mass. vol. 9, ch. 265, § 26; Mich. 
Stata.Ann. vol 215, § 28.581, Comp.Laws 
1948. § 750.349: Mo.R.B.A. vol. 13. f 
4414: Rev.Code Mont. [1935] Ann. vol. 
5, § 10970.1: Rev.Stata. of Nebr. [1943] 
vol. 2, eh. 28. I 417: N.Mex.Stats.1941 
Ann., vol 3, § 41-2503; Gen.Stats.N.C. 
1943, voL I, § 14·39: 10 Page'. Ohio 
GeD.Code AnD. I 12427; OkI.Stnts.Ann. 
[1937) title 21. I 745: Ore.Comp.Law. 
Ann. vol. 3, § 23-435; Purdon's Pa.Stats. 
Ann .• title 18, I 4723; Gen.Law. R.J. 
[1938], ch. 606. § 21: Code ofS.C. 
Tol, I, I 1122: S.D.Cod. [1939] voL 1. 
I 13.2701; Williams Tenn.Code, vol 7, 
I 10795;: Vernon'. Texas Pen-Code, voL 
. . Thus, although' the state lawsenactecf 
during the Lindberg era va.ygreatlYin 
specific phraseology, the great body of them 
define ·the 'crime as -kidnaping -f~r ransom 
2, Art. 11TTa: Utah Code Ann.' [1943], 
vol. 5, § 103-33-1(b) (1): Virginia 
Code 1936 Ann. *_ 4407; Vermont Stat's. 
[1947], § 8259; Remington's Rev.Stats. 
Wash. vol. 4, § 2410-1; W.Virg.Code"' 
[1943] Ann., § 5929 (3) ; Wisc.Stats. 
[1943] I 340.56; Rev.Stats.Maine, vol. 2, 
ch. 117, § 14: also Code of Ala." [1940], 
Tit. 14, § 7; Burns .Iud.Stata.Alln. "vol. 
4. [1942 Rep.) 10·2903: Code of Iowa 
[1946). vol. 2, I 706.3. I.C.A.: La.Cod. 
of Crim.L. & Proc. [1943], Art. 740-44;: 
N.J.S.A. 2:143-1. 
2. 39 McKinney's Consol.Lnws of N.Y.Penal 
Law pt. 2, I 1250; Rev.Laws of N~ H. 
[1942], p. 1827; Minn.Stats.Ann. vol. 
40. § 619.34: Rev.Code DeL [11l35]. I 
5174: Ann.Code Md. [1939] vol. 1, Art. 
27, § 385. Possibly Washington should 
also be listed here as a result of judicial 
construction of .their statute. State v. 
Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d553: 
State v. Berry, :wo Wash. 495, 93 P.2d_ 
782, noted _and criticized In 38 Colomb. 
L.R. 1287: 19 Ore.L.R. 301. 
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or extortion in the American gangland 
tradition of the early 1930s. The two ex-
ceptions to the general rule are found (1) 
in the New York act which, in effect, makes 
"common law" kidnaping, such as is defined 
'in section 207 of our Penal Code, a capital 
offense; and (2) in the California statute, 
which includes robbery as one of the pur-
poses of the crime. 
If simple detention during robbery is 
kidnaping, the scope and coverage of the 
California and New Yark statutes go far 
'beyond any normal conceptions of kidnap-
ing for ransom. The very severity 'of the 
punishment,3 and the revolting nature of 
the crimes which were the driving force 
behind such modern statutes, make it ob-
vious that detention incidental to robbery is 
not kidnaping. These kidnaping for ran-
som statutes are "to be construed in the 
light of [their] contemporary historical 
background" Finch v. State, 116 Fla. 437, 
442, 156 So. 489, 491; and "the act must be 
ao construed to avoid the absurdity. The 
court must restrain the words. The object 
designed to be reached by the act must limit 
and control the literal import of the terms 
and phrases employed. 1 Kent's Com. 462; 
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366, 
370, 24 Mass. 366, 370; United States v. 
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 400, 2 L.Ed. 304." 
State v. Qark, 29 N.J.L. 96. 
The conrt. which construed the exceed-
ingly broad langnage of the New York 
statute were among the first to re'cognize 
the reasonable limitations which must be 
placed upon the language used in such 
legislation. Thus, in People v. Kuntzsch, 
Co.Ct., 64 N.Y.S.2d 116, which was a case 
involving an abduction for union member-
ship purposes during a strike, the court 
dismissed an indictment for kidnaping, say .. 
ing: "A literal reading of the statute makes 
a wilful seizure with intent to confine~ 
against the will or the person seized, a 
kidnaping. Such a literal construction can 
. be carried to Rbsurd extremes. * * * 
The Court in construing the Statute should 
3. In California, although first degree mur-
der is punishable by death or life im-
prisonment, Pen.Code, § 190, kidnaping 
for purposes of extortion or robbery may 
keep in mind the penalty imposed for viola-
tion of the statute. The crime is most se-
rious." 64 N.Y.S.2d at pages 118-119;/see 
also, Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd 
Ed. § 46, p. 129. 
The federal courts have also shown a 
recent tendency to retreat from their form-
er broad construction of the intent required 
under the Lindberg Law. That act speci-
fies, "for ransom or reward or other-&Jise/' 
In Gooch v. United States, 1936, 297 U.S. 
124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 3%, 80 L.Ed. 522, the 
u or otherwise" clause was given a broad 
construction to cover non-monetary bene-
fits. However, recently, in Chatwin v. 
United States, 1946, 326 U.S. 455, 66 S.Ct. 
233, 90 L.Ed. 198, the court considered the 
conviction of an advocate of polygamous 
'Icelestial marriages," who was charged 
with taking a small girl from Utah into 
Mexico, going through a marriage cere-
mony with her and then returning to Ari-
zona where they resided as man and wife. 
The prosecution was under the "or other-
wise" clause of the Lindberg Law. In re-
versing the conviction, it was said: "The 
stipulated facts of this case reveal a situa-
tion quite different from the general prob-
lem to which the framers of the Federal 
Kidnaping Act addressed themselves. * • * 
Comprehensive language was used to cover 
every possible variety of kidnaping fol-
-lowed !by interstate transportation * * * 
[but] were we to sanction a careless con-
cept of the crime of kidnaping or were we 
to disregard the background and setting 
of the Act the boundaries of potential lia-
bility would be lost in infinity. * * * 
The absurdity of such a result, with its at-
tendent likelihood of unfair punishment 
and blackmail, is sufficient by itself to fore-
close that construction." 326 U.S. at pages 
462-465, 66 S.Ct. at page 236. In reaching 
its conclusions concerning the particular 
crime for which Knowl~s should be pun-
ished, the court- attempts to dismiss the 
Chatwin case by saying there ". * * 
is no intimation that had the restraint been 
be punished by death or life imprison-
ment without p08sibilit1l of parole, if the 
victim suffers bodily· harm. Pen.Code., t 
209. 
PEOPLE v.KNOWLES Cal. lG 
a ... I1' .... 1 
forcible, the transportation would not have over, ftewing the transaction in its eDtirct>". 
been within the broad meaning of the 'or it was an orthodox kidnaping. 
otherwise' clause of the federal a'Ct." This, 
however, does not give proper weight to 
the broad policy stated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in refusing to 
" * • * sanction a careless concept of 
the crime of kidnapping * • ·0" 
Applying the rule of the Chatwin case, 
the facts shown in the prosecution of 
Knowles reveal a situation quite different 
from the general conduct against which the 
framers of the statute directed legislation. 
Clearly, he was a participant in an anned 
robbery, but only by a strained construction 
of section 209 may his a'Cts be said to con-
stitute kidnaping for the purpose of rob-
bery. The record includes no evidence 
showing any plan to control the victims' 
whereabouts as a method of extorting 
money from them or their friends. The 
dominant act was the robbery. It could 
have :been accomplished without requiring 
the victims to go into the storeroom. That 
movement was merely incidental to the 
robbery; it was a movement during the rob-
bery, but it was not a considered and es-
sootial prelude to the robbery. Unques-
tionably. the crime Knowles committed was 
not kidnaping for the purpose of robbery in 
the sense that the Legislature intended by 
the enactment and amendment of section 
209 of the Penal Code. 
This conclusion logically follows the ra-" 
tionale of the cases decided when the stat-
ute enacted in i90 i was in effect. In People 
v. Fisher, 1916, 30 Ca1.App. 135, 157 P. 7, 
the court prefaced its statement of facts 
by noting that the record "reads as though 
it were a tale of medieval brigandage." 
The defendants seized the victim on the 
highway and forced him to write a note to 
his secretary explaining his absence. They 
then drove him from Merced to Stockton, 
where he escaped and they were captured. 
Wire-tapping equipment, unsigned deeds to 
all of the victim's real property and a num-
ber of blank promissory notes were found 
in the automobile. This waS a dear case of 
kidnaping for the purpose of ·robbery, that 
is, the property" "WaS""to be obtained from a 
victim's persori withoitt his consent. ~rfbr('-
The other cases which were prosecuted 
under the 1901 act were decided upon simi-
lar facts. In People v. Lombard, i933, 131 
Ca1.App. 525, 21 P.2d 955, a conviction of 
attempt to commit kidnaping "for purposes 
of ransom was sustained upon facts which 
showed the usual kidnap plan: a hideaway 
prepared, ransom notes and other prepara-
tions for extorting money. And ~eople 
v. Wagner, 1933, 133 CaI.App. 775, 24 P. 
2d 927, according to one of the defendants 
in the case, was "just a case of one racket 
playing on another." The court there said 
that "the object of kidnaping which is 
made an offense by the statute is not pri. 
marily the seizure and restraint of the vic-
tim, but the mulcting him or his relatives 
or friends of money or other properly 
through coercion." 133 Cal. at page 780, 
24 P.2d at page 928. 
The first decision in which this court con-
sidered the effect of the 1933 amendment 
to section 209 of the Penal Code is Peopl. 
v. Tanner, 1935, 3 CaI.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324. 
The defendants believed that the victim had 
a large amount of cash hidden in his house. 
He was accosted in his car just outside his 
garage and was forced to re-enter the 
house. For over an hour he was ques ... 
tionedl threatened, and finally tortured ,as 
the defendants attempted to find out where 
the "real m-oney" was hidden. FhiaIly, 
they became convinced that their inf9rma-
tion was incorrect and there was no large 
sum of money in the house. Although the 
asportation was slight, it was clearly con-
nected with a prearranged plan which 
called for protracted holding and coercion 
to obtain from the victim property which 
would not have been available in the course 
of an ordinary armed robbery. This was 
the type of criminal conduct which the Leg-
islature sought to prevent by making a 
capital crime of kidnaping "for the purpose 
of robbery." 
At ieast four other prosecutions unde. 
the 1933 amendment may be placed within· 
the "Saine" category. "' In on"e of them, there 
waS: (\ rri"f)n hr('ak in '"\.vhich the wardeD 
1 l " 
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and Other'~officials were 'detained· fer.tlle) 
purpose of obtaining money and clothing 
and to assure safe exit from the prison. 
The seizure and transportation was as much 
for the purpose of robbery as for purpose 
of obtaining human shields for the escape. 
I t was all part of an organized plan to seize 
the victims and secure the escape.' People 
v. Kristy, 4 Cal.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798. People 
v. Grimes, 35 Cal.App.2d 319, 95 !?2d 486, 
pres~nts an excellent example of orthodox 
kidnaping for ransom. A farmer's wife 
was taken from her home after a demand 
was made for $25,000 under threat that 
otherwise she would never be seen ,again. 
People v. Salter, 59 Cal.App.2d 59, 137 P.2d 
'840, concerned a situation similar to that 
shown in- People v. Tanner, supra. The 
defepdants seized the victim in his-drive~ay 
and thereafter held him, both in his house 
a~d in a car'dt:iven allant town, while they 
attempted 'to obtain from him the combina-
tion to his office safe. And the prosecu-
tion in People v. Anderson, 87 Cal.App.2d 
857, 197 P.2d 839, was based upon the kid-
naping for robbery of a used car dealer 
~ho was taken on a feigned demonstration 
ride. All of these decisions, upon their 
facts, affirmed judgments of conviction for 
seizing and carrying away a person for a 
purpose which could not be accomplished 
at the place where he was attacked. 
To ascertain the legislative intent in the 
amendment of section 209, reference prop-
erly may be made to Senate Bill No. ·1226 
and Assembly Bill No. 334 which were 
enacted in 1933. These bills, identical 
in text, were entitled "An act to amend 
section 209 of the Penal Code, relating 
to the punishment of kidnaping." After 
the Legislature passed the Assembly bill, 
a report on it was made to the Gov-
ernor by the Legislative Counsel, who is 
charged with the duty of advising him, 
as well as the legislators, upon pending 
bills and other matters, Government Code, 
§§ 10230-10245; Rule 34 of the Joint Rules 
of the Senate and Assembly, California 
4. The 1939 amendment to the extortion 
. statute, which added the language lithe 
, obtaining' of an official act of a public 
officer, induced by a wrongful use of 
force or fear," Pen.Code I 518, Am.Stati. 
Le~sliiture; 1949.- The report analyzed the 
proposed amendment as follows: "This bill 
enlarges the definition of kidnapping. It 
makes the doing of the designated act or 
acts an offense by deleting the existing re-
quirement that the seizure or carrying 
away must be done maliciously, forcibly 
or fraudulently, and includes within the 
definition one who aids or abets." 
liThe existing penalty for kidnapping, 
upon conviction, is imprisonment in the 
state prison for from 10 years to life. This 
bill specifies * * * (greatly increased] 
penalties." 
The Legislative Counsel's opinion went to 
the governor while the bills were being con· 
sidered by him. "The executive is, by the 
constitution, a component part of the law-
making power. In approving a law, he is 
• * * supposed to act * * * as a 
part of the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment!~ Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165, 
172. And the enactment of legislation re-
quires the concurrent action not only of the 
two houses of the Legislature, but of the 
governor. See: Davies v. City of Los An-
geles, 86 Cal. 37, 50, 24 P. 771. "While en-
gaged in considering bills • • • pre-
sented to him for approval or disapproval, 
he is acting in a legislative capacity, and not 
as an executive." Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 
498, SOl, 105 :? 593, 594, 20 Ann.Cas. 158, 
36 L.R.A., N.S., 244. See also Wright v. 
United States, 302 U.S. 583, 58 S.C!. 395, 
82 L.Ed. 439; Edwards v. United States, 
286 U.S. 482, 52 S.C!. 627, 76 L.Ed. 1239. 
Presumably, in considering the two bills, 
the governor relied upon, or at least con-
sidered, the opinion of the Legislative 
Counsel. As the legislation was presented 
to him by his advisor, the only purpose of 
the amendment of section 209 was to omit 
the requirement that the acts specified by 
the statute then in effect be done maliciously 
and to ehange the penalties for kidnaping. 
Since the amendment in 1933, the deci-
sions of this court have consistently recog-
1939, p. 2017, would appear to inore aptly 
bring such prison break Jddnapings under 
the heading of "for the purpose ot ex-
tortion." 
1'.EU1'LE v. KNOWLES Cal. 17 
Cite .. 111 P old. 1 
nized the distinct characteristics of kid-
naping and robbery. Before the present 
tase, whenever the conviction of one found 
guilty of both kidnaping and robbery aris-
ing out of the same chain of events was 
upheld, the judgment as to each crime has 
been affirmed. By these decisions, impliedly 
at least, it has been held that one can com-
mit robbery without also being guilty of 
kidnaping; until now the court has not 
held that the same act may constitute both 
kidnaping and robbery. The decisions are 
to the contrary. In re Pearson, 30 Ca1.2d 
871, 186 P.2d 401 [kidnaping for the pur-
pose of committing robbery and attempted 
robbery of one Afornin; see People v. 
Pearson, 41 CatApp.2d 614, 617, 107 P.2d 
463, for details]; People v. Brown, 29 Cal. . 
2d 555, 176 !?.2d 929 [kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery and robbery of one Mrs. 
Jacobs]; People v. Dorman, 28 Ca1.2d 846, 
172 P.2d 686 [kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery and robbery of one Bigelow]; 
Peoplev. Britton, 6 Ca1.2d 8, 56 P.2d 493 
[one charge of kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery and two charges of robbery]; 
People v. Kristy, 4 Cal.2d 504, 50 P.2d 798 
[four eounts of kidnaping for the purpose 
of r6bbery and {our counts of robbery]; 
People v. Tanner, 3 Ca1.2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 
[two counts of kidnaping and two counts 
of robbery of one Bodkin and his wife]. 
In People v. Dorman, supra, the defend-
ant was convicted upon one count for mur-
der, one count for kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery, and three counts for rob-
bery. In affirming the judgment, Justice 
Shenk discussed "* * * the undisput-
ed acts of transporting Bigelow to an iso--
1atOO spot, and * * * robbing him" 
[28 Ca1.2d 846, 172 P.2d 690] as sufficient 
evidence to support each of the convictions. 
A later case is People v. Brown, supra, in 
which Justice Traynor spoke for the court 
in affirming convictions for two counts of 
robbery and One of kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery, where the victim suffered 
bodily harm. The inost recent decision is 
In re Pearson, supra, in which a petition' 
for a writ of habeas corpus was denied one' 
imprisoned following convictions for kid-
naping and attempted robbery based upon 
217 P.2d-2 
the same facts. At page 878 . of the opin-
ion in 30 Cal.2d, 186 P.2d at page 405, Jus-
tice Schauer stated as to the conviction for 
kidnaping, "Petitioner is legally imprisoned 
for life without possibility of parole under 
a judgment * * • verdict which so 
fixes his punishment." 
By the present decision, the court sub 
silentio has overruled the cases cited. And 
if since 1933 an act of robbery has also con~ 
stituted kidnaping, the defendants in those 
cases were entitled to the same relief now, 
given KnQwles. 
The majority opinion attempts to dis-
tinguish the prior decisions upon the ground 
that, in each of them, U * * • the acts 
that formed the basis of the kidnaping con-
viction were separate from those that in-
volved the actual taking of property_ 
• * *" If this be true, the present case 
apparent1y is the first one in reported Cali-
fornia legal history where there were in-
separable acts of robbery and kidnaping. 
Furthermore,· assuming that the records up-
on which convictions for robbery and kid-
naping for the purpose of robbery were 
affirmed by this court showed separable acts 
constituting these crimes, the decisions in 
those cases are entirely inconsistent with 
the conclusions now reached. It cannot be 
said with any certainty whether the triers 
of fad placed the judgments of conviction 
upon evidence of the incidental detention 
necessary to relieve the victims of their 
property, or upon testimony concerning 
the defendants' conduct not directly con- . 
nected with the robberies. As now stated, 
every robbery is a kidnaping because of 
such incidental detention and one is unable 
to say which act the jury relied upon as 
the basis for its verdict of gullty of kid-
naping. If in the prior cases the juries 
determined 'that there was detention inci-
dental to robbery and based the convictions 
for the kidnapings upon that evidence, 
then, as here, the judgment of conviction 
for robbery should have been reversed. 
This is true because, under the new formu-
la, either the evidence as to detention inci-
dental to robbery or that concerning an. 
independent act unrelated to robbery would 
support the judgment of conviction for 
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kidnaping. And applying section 654 of 
the Penal Code as used in the majority 
opinion, where, as in the present case, the 
conviction for robbery and for kidnaping 
for the purpose of robbery are based upon 
the robbery alone, the conviction of the 
lesser crime should have been set aside. 
To summarize my conclusions, the gram-
matical construction and language of the 
statute, the legislative history and develop .. 
ment of section 209, the legislative intent 
as derived from the history and circum-
stances surrounding the enactment of the 
1933 amendment clearly show that one can 
commit robbery without also being gUilty 
of k1dnaping. Considering particularly the 
facts shown by the present record, I see no 
basis whatever for holding that one who 
moves his victim within the immediate 
zone of the crime merely to facilitate the 
robbery, or detains him briefly in order to 
obtain property from him is guilty of kid-
naping. 
Otherwise stated, if there be detention 
alone, it must follow a traditional act of 
kidnaping in order to render the one detain~ 
ing guilty of that crime. It is true that sec-
tion 209 does not in every case require as~ 
portation, although that is an element usual-
ly present in kidnaping. But the seizure, 
confinement, inveigling, enticing, decoying, 
abducting, concealing, kidnaping or carry~ 
ing a,way must be done, as the words them-
selves demonstrate, to control the victim's 
whereabouts for the purpose of robbery or 
extortion. If the defendant's control of 
the location of the victim's person is purely 
transitory or incidental, as in the ordinary 
robbery, the crime is not kidnaping. 
I would reverse the judgments of convic-
tion for kidnaping, and affirm the judg-
ments of conviction for robbery. 
GIBSON, C. J., con~urs. 
CARTER, Justice (dissenting). 
I am in full accord with the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Edmonds, but feel that something 
further should be said in regard to the 
holding in the majority opinion. It is there 
held that a robbery is also a violation of 
section 209 pf the Penal Code, called "kid-
napping." The prosecuting attorney is giv-
en the sale and arbitrary power to deter-
mine whether a person shall suffer life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole or 
even death on the one hand, or, in the case 
of robbery in the second degree, as little 
as one year's imprisonment. It aU depends 
on the charge he choo~es, at his whim or 
caprice, to make against the accused. If 
,he charges both robbery and kidnapping and 
the defendant is convicted of both crimes, 
he must suffer the greater punishment pro-
vided for kidnapping, or, if he wishes. he 
may charge kidnapping alone and likewise 
obtairt the extreme penalty. However, he 
may charge robbery alone, and, in case of 
a conviction, lesser punishment would fol-
low. All these rhings could occur on the 
identical set of facts which establish only 
robbery as will later appear. It is not to 
be supposed that the Legislature intended 
to place any such drastic and arbitrary pow-
er in the hands of the district attorney. On 
the contrary, it is clear that it did not in-
tend to embrace the crime of robbery in 
section 209 of the Penal Code. Every rol>-
bery, whether first or second degree, neces-
sarily involves some detention or holding 
of the victim if we give those words a nar-
row and restricted meaning. The Legisla-
ture has carefuUy defined robbery and 
fixed its punishment, deeming that punish-
ment adequate. 1£ it had intended to de-
part from those provisions, it would have 
done so directly by amending the robbery 
statute. It would not have attempted to 
achieve ~hat result by amending section 209, 
the kidnap statute. The case falls squarely 
within In re Shull, Z3 Cal.2d 745, 146 P 2d 
417,419, where this court held that a statute 
imposing an additional five-year term of im-
prisonment where a felony was committed 
with a deadly weapon was not intended to 
apply to the felony of assault with a deadly 
weapon, for the elements in bot>h instan'Ces 
were the same and the punishment for the 
latter was clearly defined. It is there said: 
"It is not unreasonable to suppose that the 
Legislature believed that for felonies in 
which the use of a gun was not one of the 
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essential factors, such as rape, larceny, and 
the like, an added penalty should be im-
posed by reason of the fact that the defend-
ant being armed with such a weapon would 
probably be more dangerous because of the 
probability of death or physical injury 
being inflicted by the weapon. Hence, such 
a condition would be reasonable grounds 
for increasing the penalty where felonies 
are involved which do not include as a 
necessary element being armed with a pis-
tol. The Legislature has by other acts im-
posed an increased punishment where the 
only additional fador, being armed with a 
deadly weapon, is present. The only differ-
ence between a simple assault and one with 
a deadly weapon is the latter factor. The 
commission of a simple assault is declared 
a misdemeanor, and the punishment there-
for is a fine of not over $500 or jmprison-
ment in the county jail for six months, or 
by both. Pen.Code, secs. 240, 241. When 
there is added to the assault the use of a 
deadly weapon the punishment is increased 
to imprisonment in the state prison not ex-
ceeding ten years or in the county jail not 
exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding 
$5,000 or by both fine and imprisonment, 
Pen. Code, sec. 245, and if section 1168(2) 
(a) or 3024(a) i. applicable and rhe 
weapons therein mentioned are used, the 
minimum term is fixed at five years where 
the perpetrator is not one previously con-
victed of a felony. Briefly, the Legisla-
ture has fixed the punishment for an as-
sault where a deadJy weapon is used, a 
particular crime; and it is not to be sup-
posed that for the same offense, without 
any additional factor existing the added 
punishment should be imposed. In felonies 
where a deadly weapon is not a factor in 
the ,offense, the ,additional punishment· is 
imp6sed by section 3 of the Deadly Weap-
ons Act, 'because of the additional factor of 
a deadly weapon being involved." 
Applying the foregoing rule to the case 
at bar, it seems obvious to me that by the 
amendment to section 209 of the Penal Code 
the Legislature did not intend to make the 
punishment for kidnapping applicable t() 
robbery, but such is the holding of the ma-
jority in this case. 
Rehearing denied; GIBSON, C. J., and 
EDMONDS and CARTER, JJ., dissenting. 
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FINNEY Y. LOCKHART. 
No. L. A. 21189. 
Supreme Court of California, in Bank. 
April 19, 1950. 
Robert William Finney brought action 
against James Lockhart and others to recov-
er damages for inducing persons not to pur-
chase dog food from plaintiff. A judgment 
for plaintiff against named defendant was en-
tered by the Superior Court, Los Angeles 
County, Clarence L. Kincaid, ;r., and the 
named defendant alone appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Shenk, J., held that verdict 
awarding $1.00 general and $2,000 exemplary 
damages could not be set aside on ground of 
excessiveness of award of exemplary dam-
ages on appeal on judgment roll alone. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Prior opinion, 208 P.2d 25. 
I. Libel and slander c8=133, 125 
In action for damages for defamation 
per se, the law presumes general damages, 
and it is unnecessary to segregate exact or 
any proportion hetween a-ctual and exem-
plary damages. Civ.Code, § 3294. 
2. Conspiracy ~20 
The fact that jury in action to recover 
damages for inducing persons not to pur-
chase dog food from plaintiff awarded only 
nominal damages in the compensatory class 
did not necessarily imply finding that no 
more actual damages were sustained. Civ. 
Code, § 3294. 
S. Appeal and error ~I004(1) 
Reviewing court's power to declare an 
award of damages excessive exists only 
when from facts the amount appears at 
first blush to suggest passion or prejudice 
on part of jury, and there is no distinction 
when review is of an award of exemplary 
rather than actual damages. Civ.Code, § 
3294. 
4. Appeal and error ~I004(3) 
After award of damages has been ap-
proved by trial court the reviewing court 
will hesitate to declare ,amount excessive 
unless upon consideration of entire record 
including the evidence it must be said that 
